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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
John L. Flynn*

Accuracy of Radar in Measuring Vehicle's
Speed Not Proper Subject for Judicial NoticeDefendant was convicted of driving in excess
of the speed limit. Over defendant's objection,
the judge judicially noted the theory and
accuracy of the operation of a radar device in
measuring speed. On appeal, reversed. People
of City of Bufalo v. Beck, 130 N.Y.S.2d 354
(1954). The appellate court concluded that
"'electronics is a recent development in the
science embracing the mystery of electricity"
and not "the general knowledge of the country" so as to be a proper subject for judicial
notice. Moreover, every reasonable doubt as to
whether a fact is so "notorious" that a court
may take judicial notice of it should be resolved
in the negative. Cited in the opinion is People
v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179
(Sup. Ct. 1953) in which the court determines
that the accuracy of radar evidence must be
established by the ordinary rules of evidence
unless the legislature enacts a prima facie presumption. But see also State v. Moffitt, 100
A.2d 778 (Del. 1953) where radar evidence of
vehicle's speed was held admissible after an
expert had testified in detail as to its operation,
construction, and margin of error.
Police Officer May Not Discharge Firearm in
Apprehending Motorlst-A police officer who
fired his revolver in the direction of an automobile whose driver failed to obey his signal to
stop was held to have violated an Ohio statute
declaring that no person shall discharge a firearm upon a public road or highway. State v.
Elder, 120 N.E.2d 508 (Ohio 1953). The defense
argued that the statutory phrase, "no person",
was not intended to include persons lawfully
authorized to bear firearms, but the court re* Senior Law Student, Northwestern University
School of Law.

fused to read any exceptions into this "plain
and unambiguous" phrase. However, the court
pointed out that generally peace officers may
discharge firearms in the attempt to effectuate
the arrest of a felon, but may not do so to effect
an arrest for a misdemeanor even though the
officer's purpose is merely to stop flight and
the misdemeanant cannot otherwise be taken.
City Must Post Parking Regulation SignsDefendant on four separate dates received
summonses for parking on a public street in the
City of Schenectady, New York in violation of
a municipal ordinance regulating nighttime
parking. He pleaded not guilty on the ground
that signs had not been posted restricting the
length of parking. The prosecution while conceding that no such signs were posted, alleged
that after the defendant received the first summons he had actual notice, and therefore is
guilty of at least the three subsequent violations. The prosecution also contended that
actual notice is the equivalent or superior to
posted signs and that it would cost approximately $65,000 to post signs in a city the size
of Schenectady. The court in overruling these
contentions held that since the ordinance did
not contain a provision for posting as required
by state statute, it was defective and could not
be cured by knowledge of its existence. As to the
cost argument the court said that any relief
would have to be obtained from the legislature.
People v. Evans, 131 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1954). The
question as to whether actual notice would
suffice if the ordinance contained a provision
for posting that was not complied with, was not
considered. However, it seems clear that such a
procedure would be invalid as not in accord
with the mandate of the statute.
Plea of Nolo Contendere to Drunken Driving
Charge Does Not Create an Estoppel in Revo-

POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES

cation Proceeding-Petitioner had pleaded
nolo contendere to the criminal charge of
driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Thereafter,
petitioner received notice that his driver's
license had been suspended by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles because he had
"committed an offense" for which mandatory
suspension is required. The Commissioner
suspended the license solely on the conviction
entered upon the plea. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina affirmed a judgment for petitioner. The plea alone was not satisfactory
evidence authorizing the Commissioner to suspend the license and did not estop the petitioner from denying his guilt in the civil revocation action. Winseti v. Scheidt, 239 N.C. 190,
79 S.E.2d 501 (1954). The court conceded,
however, that if the suspension was part of the
judgment in the case in which the plea was
tendered or made a condition to acceptance,
the defendant would have no cause for complaint.
Arrest Without a Warrant-Police officers
arrested the defendant without a warrant for
public drunkenness. The defendant, asserting
he was not drunk, resisted the arrest and a
scuffle ensued. The jury returned a verdict of
not guilty of public drunkenness, but guilty of
resisting arrest and simple assault. On appeal
the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed.
State v. Mobley, 83 S.E.2d 100 (N.C.1954). The
opinion is a lucid exposition on the subject of
arrest. It is axiomatic that every person has the
right to resist an unlawful arrest with such
farce as reasonably appears necessary. Since it
was conceded that unnecessary force was not
used, the question resolved to whether the
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officers had the right to arrest without a warrant. The court points out the common law
rule that an arrest without a warrant is unlawful. Exceptions were then made in the case
of felonies and breach of the peace on the
ground that public safety demanded "on-thespot action." A statute declaratory or the
common law confers on peace officers the
right to make arrests without process when the
officer has "reasonable grounds to believe" (1)
a felony has been committed, (2) that a particular person is guilty, and (3) that such person
may escape if not immediately arrested. Thus
the felony need not be committed in the
presence of the officer nor is it essential that it
be committed at all as long as reasonable
grounds exist. A private citizen may arrest only
when a felony is actually committed in his
presence and if he arrests either (1) the guilty
person, or (2) the person he had reasonable
grounds to believe guilty. Peace officers and
private citizens have the power of arrest without a warrant in non-felony cases only for a
breach or threatened breach of the peace. The
court concluded that "mere drunkenness which
is unaccompanied by language or conduct
reasonably calculated to create public disorder"
is not a breach of the peace so as to justify
arrest without a warrant.
The dissent argued that to require an officer
to determine at his peril before making arrest
that a breach of the peace is actually committed would "inflict a crippling blow on law
enforcement." It should be noted that many
jurisdictions and municipalities have provisions
allowing an arrest without process upon probable cause that a breach of the peace has been
committed or for any crime committed in the
presence of the officer.

